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Abstract
This paper reviews the Church–Turing Thesis (or rather, theses) with reference to their origin and application and considers some
models of “hypercomputation”, concentrating on perhaps the most straight-forward option: Zeno machines (Turing machines with
accelerating clock). The halting problem is brieﬂy discussed in a general context and the suggestion that it is an inevitable companion
of any reasonable computational model is emphasised. It is suggested that claims to have “broken the Turing barrier” could be toned
down and that the important and well-founded rôle of Turing computability in the mathematical sciences stands unchallenged.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The popular and scientiﬁc literature in foundational aspects of computer science and in physical science have of
late been replete with obituaries for the Church–Turing Thesis (CTT) and triumphant announcements of the dawn
of “hypercomputation” (the “scare quotes” around which are to be carelessly omitted from this point on). Some of
the proponents of this idea and their readers believe that somehow the CTT has been disproved. It is often not quite
clear however what exactly they take the Thesis to mean. Indeed, some authors even claim Turing’s oracle machine
(O-machine) to have been a precursor of a new kind of computation, which obviously it was not [24]. This paper is an
attempt to identify the nature of the claims made by several hypercomputing models and to make clear to what extent
they do—and do not—challenge the established notion of computability.
Mathematicians would note that claims to hypercompute call for a re-examination of the quite well-known solutions
of the Entscheidungsproblem as well as Hilbert’s tenth problem and should be considered very critically. In computer
science, applied mathematics and operations research these claims could challenge the formal deﬁnitions of algorithm
or computation as they have now been used for more than half a century. We start by reviewing the CTT in its various
forms, and proceed to give an overview of some unusual or novel computational schemes.
∗ Tel.: +27 82 772 7990; fax: +27 12 429 4898.
E-mail address: potgiph@unisa.ac.za.
0304-3975/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2005.11.040
24 P.H. Potgieter / Theoretical Computer Science 358 (2006) 23–33
2. Formal computation
The necessity of a formal deﬁnition of algorithm or computation became clear to the scientiﬁc community of the
early 20th century due mainly to two problems posed by David Hilbert
• the Entscheidungsproblem—can an algorithm be found that, given a statement in ﬁrst-order logic (for example, in
Peano arithmetic), determines whether it is true in all models of a theory; and
• Hilbert’s tenth problem—does there exist an algorithm which, given a Diophantine equation, determines whether
is has any integer solutions?
TheEntscheidungsproblem, ordecisionproblem, canbe tracedback in some format least toLeibniz andwas successfully
and independently resolved in the negative during the mid-1930s by Alonzo Church [9] and Alan Turing [49]. Church
deﬁned an algorithm to be identical to the deﬁnition of a function in his lambda calculus. Turing in turn ﬁrst identiﬁed an
algorithm to be identical with a recursive function and later with a function computed by what is now known as a Turing
machine (TM). It was shown that the recursive functions, Turing machine and the lambda calculus deﬁne identical
classes of functions. The remarkable equivalence of these three deﬁnitions of disparate origin strongly supports the
idea of this as an adequate deﬁnition of computability and the Entscheidungsproblem is generally considered to be
solved. Using the same deﬁnition of computability Yuri Matiyasevich showed [30] in 1970 (reﬁning and completing
work by Julia Robinson, Martin Davis and Hilary Putnam) that, within the Church–Turing framework of computation,
no algorithm for determining whether a given Diophantine equation admits integer solutions exists.
The negative answers to the Entscheidungsproblem and to Hilbert’s tenth problem are related to the halting prob-
lem for TMs: given a program or input for an arbitrary TM together with a description of the machine, is it possible
to determine algorithmically (i.e. using some other, ﬁxed, TM) whether the ﬁrst TM ever halts on the given pro-
gram or input? The answer to this question is NO. The function fT which assigns to each x the value 1 if the
Turing machine T halts on input x and 0 otherwise is the classical example of a non-computable function for a suf-
ﬁciently powerful T , speciﬁcally when T is a Universal Turing Machine (UTM) which is capable of simulating all
other TMs.
Unless it is indicated or directly implied otherwise, “computation” and “compute” in the paper will refer to the action
of and functions computed by an appropriate TM.
3. The Church–Turing theses
There are many versions and interpretations of what is loosely known as the CTT, and it would naturally be more
accurate to speak in the plural, of Church–Turing theses. The equivalence of the deﬁnitions of computability given by
Church and by Turing gave rise to the CTT which, as formulated by Turing, states that
Every ‘function which would naturally be regarded as computable’ can be computed by a TM. (CTT)
Now, certainly any recursive function or function deﬁned by lambda calculus or by any of a number of other computa-
tional schemes, including Markov algorithms, can provably be computed by a TM. The problem is that the vagueness
of the concept “function which would naturally be regarded as computable” ensures that the statement of the CTT
above is not something that can ever be proved. The following remarks (as they appear in [14]) by Alan Turing will
shed some light on his views of the universal machine and of ‘natural’ computability.
A man provided with paper, pencil, and rubber, and subject to strict discipline, is in effect a universal
machine. (1948)
The idea behind digital computers may be explained by saying that these machines are intended to carry out any
operations which could be done by a human computer. (1950)
The class of problems capable of solution by the machine [the Automatic Computing Engine (ACE)] can be
deﬁned fairly speciﬁcally. They are [a subset of] those problems which can be solved by human clerical labour,
working to ﬁxed rules, and without understanding. (1946)
Computers always spend just as long in writing numbers down and deciding what to do next as they do in actual
multiplications, and it is just the same with ACE . . . [T]he ACE will do the work of about 10,000 computers . . .
Computers will still be employed on small calculations . . . (1947)
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An absolutely crucial point here is that Turingwas thinking about a human computer which, in his time,was a calculating
clerk. CTT as stated above and with Turing’s sense of ‘naturally computable’ is what should be referred to as the CTT
and it is the only very well-established one of the four versions in this section. A stronger version of CTT, call it the
Physical CTT (PCTT) would be
Every function that can be physically computed, can by computed by a TM. (PCTT)
Here the notion “physically computed”, if including the result of any physical process (or of our model of any physical
process), is so vague that the thesis PCTT cannot but be false. For example, a TM cannot effectively approximate any
of the values of one-dimensional Brownian motion at rational points in time almost surely (with respect to Wiener
measure), as discovered by Willem Fouché [21] recently. Gandy’s Thesis [14] (or, as Gandy called it, the Thesis M)
posits that
Whatever can be calculated by a machine (working on ﬁnite data in accordance with a ﬁnite program of instruc-
tions) is Turing-machine-computable.
Yet another version of the Thesis is the following, as stated in [3]:
Any ‘reasonable’ model of computation can be efﬁciently 1 simulated on a probabilistic Turing machine. (SCTT)
This version is the Strong Church–Turing Thesis (SCTT) and it might very well be provably false, unlike CTT and
Gandy’s Thesis which—this paper will argue—remain eminently reasonable suppositions. In this regard [16,2,52,47]
are well worth also consulting.
4. Zeno machines
Hermann Weyl in 1927 raised [50] the possibility of a feasible device performing an inﬁnite number of steps in
ﬁnite time. We should understand the steps to be in some sense identical except for the time taken for their execution. 2
It can be easily seen that allowing this kind of speed-up of the computing device, one can solve the halting problem
(HP) for TMs in ﬁnite time. The solution, however, is not by a TM but by what may be called a Zeno machine (ZM)
(or Accelerated TM, see [12,13]; or, in [4], simply Zeus by Boolos and Jeffrey). As acknowledged elsewhere in the
literature, e.g. in [7], hypercomputational schemes tend to be proposals for somehow accomplishing inﬁnitely many
computational steps in a ﬁnite time, so it is apt to ﬁrst focus on the ZM in a general examination of hypercomputation.
Without loss of generality, we shall assume a ZM to be identical to a TM with one input tape, one output tape and a
storage tape except that the ZM takes 12 hour to execute the ﬁrst transition,
1
4 hour for the second,
1
8 hour for the third
etc. After one hour the ZM will have ﬁnished its operation and one will perhaps ﬁnd the answer to some tantalising
question on the output tape. For example, a ZM which, on input of a TM machine description m and natural number
n, follows the instructions
begin
write 0 on the ﬁrst position of the output tape;
i ← 1;
do
run TM m on input n for i steps;
if m has halted, write 1 on the ﬁrst position of the output tape;
i ← i + 1;
while i > 0;
end.
will after 1 h have a 0 on the output tape if TM m does not halt on input n and a 1 if TM m would indeed halt on this
input. In some sense this ZM therefore solves the HP in ﬁnite time and we have observed an appropriately constructed
ZM output a function that cannot be computed by a TM. Unfortunately however (see [44] and below) there exists no
ZM that can solve the HP for ZMs.
A typical application for a ZM would be deciding L.E.J. Brouwer’s question whether 777 appears in the decimal
expansion of  (which question also occupied Wittgenstein). By a similar but even more elementary scheme than the
1 An efﬁcient simulation is one whose running time is bounded by some polynomial in the running time of the simulated machine.
2 Incidentally, the expression of this idea precedes Turing’s precise formulation of his precise ideas around computability.
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above, we can describe a ZM that outputs 1 if it does indeed appear and 0 otherwise. A more interesting situation
is encountered when we try to disprove the Twin Prime Conjecture (TPC). Recall that the TPC states that there are
inﬁnitely many pairs of prime numbers of the form (n, n+2). In a small ﬂight of fancy one can imagine a ZM executing
the following program:
begin
i ← 1;
do
write 0 on the ﬁrst position of the output tape;
check for twin prime pairs from i up to i + 100;
if any were found, write 1 on the ﬁrst position of the output tape;
i ← i + 100;
while i > 0;
end.
Now, if the execution time of the ZM is over and 0 is in the ﬁrst position of the output tape, then clearly the TPC is
false because from some point i onward no further twin primes would have been found. But what if the TPC is true?
Now, the ﬁrst character on the output tape would have changed inﬁnitely many times from 0 to 1—and back—so the
terminal state of the device is simply undeﬁned. This example illustrates one of the problems with ZMs: in some way
we believe the terminal state of the machine to be well-deﬁned since we need to read off some result, but how?
Well, since the ZM is based on a TM, we might—not unreasonably—presume the state of the output tape as well as
the internal state of the machine to have to be well-deﬁned at the end of the computation. Horrors that might otherwise
appear including a write head that has “run away to inﬁnity”, or an output tape in undeﬁned condition (as is possible
with the TPC program above) or an undeﬁned internal state (which may happen in the case of the ZM for the HP). Just
as in the case of Thomson’s lamp 3 one might argue that any terminal state of the device after one hour is consistent
with the execution of the super-task 4 but this means that a 0 on the tape would be consistent with an inﬁnite number
of ones having been written in that position during the course of the calculation and then we would have lost the ability
to infer from the output 0 that the TPC were false. On the other hand, one could argue that the inference from 0 on
the tape that only a ﬁnite number of pairs were found was totally wrong and unwarranted, but this again leaves one
wondering about the utility of this kind of machine.
One needs to identify a terminal state of the devices (at least sometimes) in order to deﬁne the output of the machine.
Could we simply declare that any ZM has, in each computation, to stabilise some positive time before one hour has
elapsed in our description, i.e. after only ﬁnitelymany steps? Fine, but thenwe have only the haltingTuring computations
and still need to ﬁx the problematic cases. This we could do by declaring that in such cases the output tape be frozen,
the write head brought back to the beginning of the tape, the internal state of the machine stabilised and a special ﬂag
set, notifying us that we should not interpret the output on the tape as justly obtained. However, what we have done
now is to simply incorporate an oracle for the HP into the ZM! With such an oracle, who would need a ZM anyway?
Is there any indication the a ZM could be realised physically? Well, in Malament–Hogarth space-times (which
apparently include our universe), it is possible for an observer in ﬁnite time to observe arbitrarily long calculations
due to relativistic effects. This has been described in some detail by Etesi and Németi [18,19]. Devices operating in
Malament–Hogarth space-times will still present severe problems with the deﬁnition of the ﬁnal state of the (putative)
computation á la Thomson’s Lamp. Relativistic machines can sidestep this issue somewhat by imagining that the
machine or the observer is destroyed by a black hole at just the right moment, if one can consider such a gravitonic
intervention as a legitimate computational step.
The rest of this section mentions two classes of devices related to the class ZMs.
4.1. Inductive Turing machines
The inductive Turing machines were introduced by Putnam [38] and Burgin [5]. These devices operate exactly as
three-tape TMs with the exception that the inductive Turing machine (ITM) is said to compute an output y from input
3 Thomson’s lamp is an electric light, the switch of which is ﬂipped at intervals of length 12 ,
1
4 ,
1
8 , . . .
4 Thomson’s term again, in [46].
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x if the output tape contains y after some ﬁnite number of steps and then no longer changes. An ITM may be said
to compute a certain output even if the machine never reaches a halting state. In this view, and ITM is a ZM with
the meta-halting concept that the output tape must be stable after ﬁnitely many computation steps. As with a ZM,
unless the actual classical halting state has been reached, one will not in general know after a ﬁnite number of steps
whether the content of the tape corresponds to the output of the machine corresponding to a give input. Therefore, the
output is in general only deﬁned after having considered all the countably inﬁnitely many computational steps possible
for the machine. The internal state of the machine, and that of the work tape, might again display a disconcerting
resemblance to Thomson’s lamp. The sets decidable by ITMs ﬁt nicely in the arithmetic hierarchy—they are exactly
all of 02 = 02 ∩02 [6] and can solve the HP for TMs.
4.2. Inﬁnite time Turing machines
Inﬁnite time TMs [25] were introduced by Hamkins and extend the ordinary TM model by deﬁning the conﬁguration
of the device at every ordinal “time”. The operation from an ordinal to its successor is simply an ordinary TM step and
the conﬁguration of the device at a limit ordinal is deﬁned as consisting of the lim sup of the tape contents with the
head at the beginning of the tape and the machine in an initial state. There are no logical contradictions in the inﬁnite
time TM metaphor and they have given rise to an interesting theory in which, for example, P = NP, and 11 sets are
decidable by these devices. However, there is no suggestion at all of how such devices might be engineered or even
conceived in a physical theory (nor is it necessary if these devices are considered in a logic context only) so these are
“machines” in name only.
5. The halting problem for Zeno machines
TheHP, the unsolvability ofwhich has played such an important rôle in theHilbert programme and in the development
of theoretical computer science, can be stated in a relatively general context and its unsolvability shown to follow from
rather mild assumptions about the class of machine under consideration. We shall assume throughout that tokens 0
and 1 (usually the binary numbers themselves) are valid outputs of all the machines under consideration and that each
machine X deﬁnes a partial function X on the input space with values in the output space. For a more general and
extensive treatment of HP and several cognate notions the reader is referred to [51].
Deﬁnition 1. Call a class of computing devices C with uniform input and output devices a Chatrapur 5 class of
machines if
(1) there exists a representation scheme X → nX such that for each machine X (computing a partial function X)
one may use nX as input to any machine in the class C;
(2) whenever Y ∈ C computes a total function Y with values in {0, 1} then there exists a machine X ∈ C such that
X ≡ Y
∣
∣
−1Y ({0}).
The second condition means that X is identical to Y where Y = 0 and undeﬁned otherwise—this being what
one needs to prove the unsolvability of HP. The ﬁrst condition is not very exacting either—amounting (roughly) to the
existence of programmable machines in the class (some of them possibly universal).
Deﬁnition 2. The halting problem (HP) for a class of machines B, with uniform input and output devices where each
X ∈ B computes a partial function X, is said to be solved by f if
f (nZ) = domZ (nZ) for each Z ∈ B.
The halting problem proper for a class of machines B is the question whether there exists a machine Y ∈ B such that
Y solves HP for B.
5 The author introduces the informal deﬁnition and terminology here in view of the reported conception of Alan Turing in the city of Chatrapur,
in the modern-day Indian state of Orissa. Turing’s result is restated, for an arbitrary Chatrapur class.
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The following theorem is simply a restatement of Turing’s 1936 proof of the unsolvability of HP for TMs, phrased
in the terms introduced here.
Theorem 1. There is no Chatrapur class in which the halting problem is solvable.
Proof. Assume that the machine Y ∈ C solves the halting problem for the Chatrapur class C. Let X be as in the second
Chatrapur condition and consider X(nX). Now, since Y is total, either Y (nX) = 0 or Y (nX) = 1. In the ﬁrst case,
by the fact that Y solves the HP, nX /∈ domX but this is a contradiction since by deﬁnition of X, X is deﬁned on
−1Y ({0}). If, on the other hand, Y (nX) = 1 then nX ∈ domX by deﬁnition of Y but since X = Y = 0 on
domX, this is likewise a contradiction. 
It is easy to see that the TMs, for instance, form a Chatrapur class. In extending the discussion to ZMs one is
compelled to introduce a halting concept but we shall attempt to place as few restrictions as possible on the operation
of the machine.
• Whenever the output tape has a limit as the number of computational steps go to inﬁnity (i.e. the content of each
cell stabilises) and the position of the head has the limit 2 (i.e. it stabilises over the second cell) when the machine
receives input n then we’ll say that the machine computes the limiting value in the ﬁrst cell. For a (possibly partial)
bit-valued function this is taken to be the only way it can be said to be computed by a ZM.
• On the other hand, if a ZM on input n never stabilises the ﬁrst cell of the output tape, we will take n to lie outside
the domain of the partial function computed by the machine (i.e. Thomson’s Lamp may not start an output string,
as it were).
These assumptions about the functions that are computed by a ZM are not extravagant. With this partial halting concept
a ZM can already solve the HP for classical TMs. However they are sufﬁcient to ensure that no ZM for solving the HP
for the class of ZMs exists. This follows directly from Theorem 1 and the following observation.
Theorem 2. The class Z of Zeno Machines is a Chatrapur class.
Proof. Satisfaction of the ﬁrst Chatrapur condition is trivial since a ZM has the same description as a corresponding
TM. Consider the second condition by letting Y be a ZM computing a binary-valued total function Y using the halting
concept described above. Construct X by adding a tweak to the description of Y : whenever Y writes 1 in the ﬁrst
position of the output tape, branch into a parallel (hyperactive) version of the operation of Y with the only modiﬁcation
being that the ﬁrst cell in the output tape is ﬂipped at each step in the operation and the halting state is replaced by an
inﬁnite loop (with continued ﬂipping of the bit in the ﬁrst cell) and whenever an instruction of the original machine
Y writes a zero to the ﬁrst cell, drop out of the hyperactive state and follow the original operation of Y (where even
halting normally is allowed). X can now be seen to have the properties required by the second Chatrapur condition.
Corollary 1. The halting problem for Zeno machines is not solvable by a Zeno machine.
Since the unsolvability of HP is a direct result of the Chatrapur conditions, it becomes inevitable in any class of
machines that can take their own description as input and which are powerful enough to satisfy the second condition.
Solving HP for some subclass of machines but not by a machine in the subclass itself 6 is not necessarily interesting
of itself. In this way, Turing’s unsolvability proof encapsulates a principle which is more fundamental and interesting
than the mere ﬁnding about the mechanics of TMs that is often taken to be. As put quite nicely in [47],
The HP, then, tells us nothing about what can be built; it tells us the mathematical constraints on what can be
computed given the way we have deﬁned computing.
which this subsection has attempted to illustrate. A similar exposition can be found in [44] and in [15].
Ord and Kieu [34] have examined the HP in a similar context and although they do not disagree with the premises
or with the conclusion, they do not ﬁnd it an argument detracting from the value of hypercomputation, essentially
6 HP for a subclass of TMs is in fact solvable by TM—for example, by the TM computing the constant function 1.
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on the basis that for many classes of proposed hypercomputation devices one either does not really want to solve the
generalised HP, or does not want the class of devices to satisfy the Chatrapur conditions.
6. Other non-conventional computing
It is fascinating and delightful that a physical process can be conceived that solves the HP, for example a quantum
process or a relativisticmachine. In our view theCTT, in the usual form (CTT), is quite independent of such experiments.
Turing, after all, was trying to delineatemathematically the power of a human computerwhenworking to a ﬁnite number
of clearly enunciated rules. Whatever one calls ‘computable’ should be by a process which is in principle physical but
the converse—that any physical process should be considered a computation—demolishes the very distinctness of the
notion of computability. It has long been quite clear that certain physical processes (or, at least, their models) give rise
to non-computable objects. It was shown in 1982 for example [37] by Pour-El and Richards that computable boundary
conditions for the three-dimensional wave equation exist that give rise to non-computable solutions. More recently,
Fouché has pointed out [21] that for a generic one-dimensional Wiener process (one from a certain measure one set of
trajectories) all the values assumed by the process at recursive real numbers are non-recursive. Fouchè’s result really
implies that if a Wiener process trajectory is selected at random then with probability one the value of the process at
every rational (and other recursive) time will be a non-computable real number. One can think of this as meaning that
when a grain of pollen (recalling Robert Brown and confusing physical reality and its model for a moment) is observed
at rational intervals, then it will always be observed at an uncomputable position in space.
The idea that a physical process can produce non-computable output (as also pointed out it [14]) is therefore not
novel. Quantum computing, machines exploiting relativistic time effects and bio-molecular computing are popular
tools for researchers attempting to “jump the Turing barrier” and the rest of the section consists of a brief survey of
their power and application.
6.1. Quantum computation
It is well known that in 1982 Richard Feynman, in a talk at MIT [20], proposed using quantum mechanical phenom-
ena in order to perform computations. He identiﬁed the immense compactness of representing information in qubits
(quantum bits) due to the superposition principle and the potential of quantum systems to be used in practical computa-
tion. The same ideas were in fact expressed 7 by Yuri Manin somewhat earlier. The principle is that a ﬁnite-dimensional
quantum system is somehow prepared in an initial state and acted upon by operators corresponding to normal events in
quantum computation. The action of the operators transposes the state of the system to one which reveals meaningful
results when the complex quantum state of the system is disturbed through measurement. The intricacies of quantum
interactions can, it is thought, give such a device some advantage over a classical computer. In 1985, David Deutsch
[17] proposed a universal quantum computer (UQC) for this model, similar to the UTM, which should simulate any
other quantum computer, i.e. which should be able to compute any function computable by a quantum TM which is
speciﬁed as part of the input. Deutsch’s construction has been questioned [41,33] and the existence of a universal 8
quantum computer (in this sense) has not been clearly established in the eyes of many. Any quantum computation of
this sort can be simulated (but not necessarily effectively) by a probabilistic Turing machine (PTM) and hence on a
deterministic TM (see [43,3], for example, for a detailed discussion of why this is the case).
What then are the successes of quantum computing so far? Quantum computing offers great potential for speeding up
calculations and the followingmilestones areworth noting: Shor’s 1994 algorithm for integer factorisation [42];Grover’s
1996 algorithm [23] to speed up search in an unordered list, with quadratic speedup over its classical counterpart.
A quantum TM as deﬁned in [17] cannot however compute any function that cannot also be computed by an ordinary
probabilistic TM. Since the quantum computer is apparently faster than a classical computer for several problems it
would seem that the SCTT is perhaps violated by quantum computers as illustrated in [3] but as yet no example has
been found that would survive a proof of P = NP.
7 In a Russian text-book [31]. Also see [35,36], the latter with the actual text and a translation into English. Manin’s remarks are well-known to
Russian authors and cited in [28] for example.
8 Universality is a substantial and important issue to be examined in a later contribution.
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It is sometimes argued that because the fundamental nature of reality is quantum mechanical rather than classical,
quantum computing must be more powerful than classical computing but this is a complete fallacy, as is the suggestion
that since quantum cryptology is more powerful than classical cryptology (which is really the case) the same should
follow for quantum computing. Since the classical CTT places no restriction on the time required to simulate the
computation on an ordinary TM, quantum computation (via quantum circuits as in [28] or Deutsch-type quantum TMs)
is therefore at best (possibly faster) ordinary computation using other hardware.
6.2. Quantum processes
Quantum processes beyond the established deﬁnition of quantum computation by QTM or by quantum gates provide
some further interesting and curious results. In a recent publication, Calude and Pavlov [8] have described a quantum
process that solves the HP correctly with probability tending to 1 constructively as the time for computation tends to
inﬁnity. Their (theoretical) device therefore evaluates a function which cannot be computed by a TM. 9 However, as
clearly pointed out by the authors, their device operates in an inﬁnite dimensional Hilbert space in contrast to canonical
quantum computing. A similar notion of Nielsen is discussed in [47].
T.D. Kieu has proposed [26] another interesting process: a procedure to determine whether an arbitrary Diophantine
system has solutions or not, in apparent violation of the accepted solution to Hilbert’s Tenth Problem. As Kieu himself
states clearly, this is not a “standard quantum computation” (in his terminology, in [26]). Kieu’s solution method
has been roundly criticised in some corners (for example [48] to which Kieu [27] has replied, but probably not yet
conclusively) and the terminology is rather puzzling since in the usual literature, a “quantum adiabatic” process has the
same computing power as a “standard quantum computation” (recently proved in [1]). The Kieu process is, however,
not one that can be simulated in the sense of Deutsch [17] or Bernstein and Vazirani [3].
6.3. Natural computing
By natural computing one essentially refers to models inspired by biology. Adleman in the 1990s demonstrated
the solution of the Hamiltonian path problem for a seven-node graph using DNA computing (see [39,40]). The main
advantage of DNA computing appears to be the physical compactness, the low cost of the data storage, and the easy
reproducibility of a setup for massive parallelism. The main immediate problem is that of autonomous computing,
i.e. of performing more than a small number of steps without intervention from outside the computing system (by
the lab assistant, for example). It also seems unlikely that a universal biomolecular computer will be conceived. DNA
computing does not challenge established notions of computability. It has been suggested in [7] that another metaphor
inspired by biology, the membrane computing of Pa˘un, might allow the solution of the HP for TMs in a physically
realistic manner.
7. A challenge to hypercomputation
Clearly a computation should in principle be a physically realisable or (at least) theorisable process. There is a
school of thought that holds that any conceivable physical or apparently physical process may be considered to be a
computation, but what then is the sense of having a deﬁnition of computation at all? Could not, otherwise, any problem
arising in practise simply be left to solve itself by physical simulation? The notion that, just because something happens
in reality (or in physical theory), we should put a “computational” model on it seems a bit fanciful. Few people, after all,
would think of Brownian motion as a “computation”. The inﬁnite-time TMs from 4.2 cannot be considered candidates
for hypercomputation on the grounds of there being no indication of how their operation might be realised physically.
There is also no great novelty in describing processes that are supported by classical or quantum physics that allow the
observation of non-computable results 10 as the results of Fouché and of Pour-El and Richards mentioned above clearly
9 A popular discussion, copied from New Scientist magazine may be found at 〈http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/∼cristian/
smashandgrab.htm〉.
10 How, actually, since we shall only ever check a ﬁnite initial segment of the output? But that is another question. . . .
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show. Neither is it a breakthrough to simply conjecture a model in which interesting problems can be solved—this can
be done by simple ZMs (apart from the problem of deﬁning the ﬁnal state).
One task of those studying hypercomputation should be to describe physically realisable processes leading to
interesting results. The reported ability of the quantum processes of 6.2 and the membrane computing mentioned
in 6.3 to solve the HP or Hilbert’s 10th problem is much more interesting therefore than the action of ZMs—which,
after all, could be said to be able to solve the same problems—since the description of the process is much closer
(in the absence of a conveniently situated Malament–Hogarth space-time) to what we perceive as a real and executable
physical process. Whether these processes providing interesting “outputs” should be called computations of any kind
or not is then a matter of (changing the) convention, against which change a mild prejudice is freely admitted by the
author for reasons given below.
8. Conclusion
The question whether every physically realisable or theorisable process should be considered a computation, should
be taken as settled in the negative. A radical revision in our view of space and time (see [29] for a very non-technical
overview) and/or human nature might however in the future necessitate a wide-ranging revision of our ideas about
mechanical computability. Until such time hypercomputation will be a useful sobriquet for physical processes that have
some semblance to but are distinct from what we have properly regarded as constituting computations since Turing,
Church, Post, Markov, Pèter e.a. When hypercomputational schemes are introduced, one should be extremely careful
as to how they are deﬁned and how their physical aspect is formulated in order to establish that one is doing something
other than introducing a partial view of the arithmetical hierarchy. Many of the advocates of hypercomputation are
well aware of the questions raised in this contribution (for example [13]) and deal with them in a different way. Firm
believers in the obsolescence of the CTT such as Goldin and Wegner [22] agree with this author and others that the
usual notion of computability is in fact mathematical and not physical. Opinions often diverge only as to the adequacy
of the essentially mathematical deﬁnition.
Zeno Machines (and related devices) do not, by the classical deﬁnition, compute. Neither does, the reader will
probably agree, an instance of Brownian motion (so ubiquitous and beloved of engineering, physics and ﬁnance)
in any intuitive sense compute non-recursive numbers although it certainly produces them in what we regard as a
physically realisable process. One customarily assumes that ﬁnite (but unbounded) time and space resources are used
by a computational device and that clearly deﬁned states of the apparatus exist at each point of the computation
(and afterwards, in the case of a halting computation). All of this is true for a Turing as well as of a quantum gate
computation but not of Zeno machines and of the other metaphors for hypercomputation. In [32] Mostowski has proved
quite elegantly that under some general and weak assumptions about avoiding an actual inﬁnity, the intuitive notion of
decidability coincides with Turing-machine decidability. It is the author’s opinion that the apparent power of these kinds
of hypercomputation is simply due to the breaking of a “ﬁnite but unbounded” principle which is—as in Mostowski’s
characterisation—fundamental to the idea of computation.
In summary: the solution to Hilbert’s tenth problem has, after all, shown that the class of recursively enumerable
sets (sets that constitute the range of a function computed by a Turing machine) is identical to the class of Diophantine
sets. The Diophantine sets form such a natural class in mathematics that it seems ill-advised to push the deﬁnition of
computability, which is primarily a mathematical and not a physical notion, beyond that stated in the Church–Turing
Thesis (CTT). Based on the conviction that (i) there is no pressing reason to want to make a computer out of every thing
in the universe; (ii) the halting problem is inescapable for Chatrapur classes of machines; and (iii) Turing computability
is in fact an intuitive and simple notion, this author has found no compelling reason for an immediate redeﬁnition of
what we mean by computable.
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